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Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation:
The Evolution of California's
Judicially Created Immunities
from Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission
By

THOMAS

K. BUCK*

Introduction
Commentators have suggested that immunity should be available
where the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked in the course
of private civil litigation.1 Federal courts, constrained by statute, have
not adopted this suggestion.2 In California, however, despite a lack of
* Deputy District Attorney, Orange County, California. B.A., 1971, Stanford University; J.D., 1976, Hastings College of the Law. The author wishes to thank Timothy Lee for
his helpful discussions with the author and Eleanor McBride for her critical reading of the
manuscript. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily
reflect those of the District Attorney of Orange County.
1. See Kaniinsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination in
Private Civil Litigaom .4 CriticalAnalysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 121, 125 n.32 (1972);
McKay, Se/f-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 231-32; Note,
Resolving Tensions Between ConstitutionalRights; Use Immunity in Concurrent or Related
Proceedings,76 CoLum. L. REv. 674, 702 (1976); Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Sep-Incrimination and Court GrantedImmunity in CivilLitigation,27 OKLA. L. RaV. 243, 249 (1974); Note,
Penalizingthe CivilLitigantWho Invokes the PrivilegeAgainstSe/f-Incrimination, 24 U. FLA.
L. Rav. 541, 554 (1972).
2. Federal courts have no discretion to grant immunity other than as authorized by
statute. See In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086, 1093-95 (5th
Cir. 1980); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978);
id. at 483-84 (Pell, J., concurring). See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 434
(1956); Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 1969). But cf. Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), see note 43 and accompanying text infra; Morgan
v. Thomas, 448 F.2d 1356, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1971) (Gewin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing view that a state court may be compelled to grant immunity in a
civil case notwithstanding an apparent lack of an authorizing state statute), cert. denied,405
U.S. 920 (1972); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 426 F.2d
619 (2nd Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.) (holding that New York city had authority to grant immunity notwithstanding the lack of an authorizing statute), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972).
Under the federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-03 (Supp. 1980), a request from
the executive branch is a necessary condition for a grant of immunity in court or grand jury
proceedings. See Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
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express statutory authorization,3 state courts have imposed immunities
in civil suits between private parties.4
The basis of the California development is found in two decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. The first, Murphy v. Wate,front
Commission,' is the 1964 seminal decision on use and derivative use
immunity. The second, Marchetti v. United States,6 is a 1968 decision
involving a constitutional attack on a federal wagering tax statute and a
refusal by the Court to save the statute by implying an immunity. After a brief discussion of the constitutional character of immunity, Part
II of this article examines Murphy andMarchettifor characteristics important to California's subsequent immunity decisions and then consid7
ers the first of these California decisions, Byers v. Justice Court.
Byers, a 1971 criminal case, was followed in 1974 by People v. Superior Court (Kaufman)8 and in 1977 by Daly v. Superior Court.' In
both Kaufman and Dal the California Supreme Court authorized immunity grants for civil litigants. Part III initially considers how the
court in Kaufman relied on Byers and Marchetti to imply a grant of
immunity. It then examines how Day extended California's immunity
grants from state initiated actions to litigation between private parties.
Parts II and III also identify the two forms of immunity grants
found in California decisions: (1) an automatic immunity where a statute, but for the immunity, would violate the privilege against self-incrimination, and (2) a discretionary grant where a civil litigant has
specifically requested an immunity order. 10 Unlike the automatic imU.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Dunham Concrete Prod., Inc., 475 F.2d 1241, 1243 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 382 (1973). Cf. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 n.9 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.) (discussing whether, in narrow circumstances, due process might require a grant of immunity for a witness called by a criminal defendant notwithstanding the
absence of an executive request); 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (Supp. 1980).
3. California's immunity statutes are limited to criminal proceedings and grand jury
investigations. See People v. Superior Court (Kaufmian), 12 Cal. 3d 421, 426-27, 525 P.2d
716,721, 115 Cal. Rptr. 812, 817 (1974); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324 (West Supp. 1981) (felony
and grand jury proceedings); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324.1 (West 1970) (misdemeanor
proceedings).
4. Daly v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 132, 560 P.2d 1193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977);
DeCamp v. First Kensington Corp., 83 Cal. App. 3d 268, 147 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1978). See also
Note, Immunity GrantsforDiscovery in PrivateCivilLitigation,66 CALIF. L. Rlv. 233 (1978).
5. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
6. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
7. 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr 553 (1969), vacatedand remandedsub.
non California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971). For a discussion of Byers, see notes 64-97
and accompanying text infra.
8. 12 Cal. 3d 421, 525 P.2d 716, 115 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
9. 19 Cal. 3d 132, 560 P.2d 1193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977).
10. The two forms of judicially created immunity are analogous to two forms of immu-
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munity found in Byers, the discretionary immunity found in Daly re-

quires prior notice to federal, state and local authorities and the
absence of law enforcement objection. These requirements allow for
sensible accommodation of the competing interests of civil litigants and

law enforcement. Because automatic immunity can substantially interfere with criminal prosecutions Part III suggests that discretionary immunity, where available, is preferred."1
Part IV reexamines the problems of automatic immunity in the
context of DeCamp v. FirstKensington Corp. ,12 a 1978 California appel-

late decision that purports to apply Byers where the privilege against
self-incrimination is asserted in a civil pleading. It is argued that the

court in DeCamp was mistaken to rely upon Byers to the exclusion of
Daly and that the court should have employed the second form of Cali-

fornia's immunity-a form that is discretionary and allows for
prosecutorial participation.
I. Background: The Fifth Amendment and Immunity
Read literally, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination applies only in criminal cases. 3 A literal construction,
however, would reduce the privilege to an empty formality, and the
Supreme Court has recognized the need to permit the invocation of the

privilege in a broad range of settings, 4 including a congressional hear-

nity statutes: automatic acts and claims acts. See McKay, supra note 1,at 229. "Most of the
federal immunity acts before 1934 are of the automatic type, which means that a witness
gains immunity from prosecution in relation to all evidence he presents in response to a
subpoena and while under oath. Later federal acts have ordinarily been claim acts, so designated because immunity attaches only after a witness asserts the privilege and is directed to
testify. This protects against the so-called 'immunity bath' precluding prosecution even in
the absence of any conscious governmental decision that securing the information is preferable to prosecution." Id. at 229 (footnotes omitted). See also Dixon, Comment on Immunity
Provisions, in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 1405 (1970); Wexler,Automatic Witness Immunity Statutes and the
InadvertentFrustrationof CriminalProsecutions-A Callfor CongressionalAction, 55 GEo.
LJ.656 (1967).
11. As to the preference of commentators for discretionary immunity, see Dixon, supra
note 10, at 1422.
12. 83 Cal. App. 3d 268, 147 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1978).
13. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For the amendment's roots in English and American soil, see L. LEvY, ORGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT (1968).
14. The Fifth Amendment "not only protects the individual against being involuntarily
called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or
informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
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ing, 15 a grand jury hearing,16 and a civil proceeding.17 The Court has
also held that the privilege extends beyond directly incriminating evidence to information forming a link in a chain of evidence.18
When the privilege is asserted in the course of civil litigation, the
party seeking the allegedly protected information may find that the information is accessible elsewhere or that the privilege is not available to
the person asserting it.' 9 If, however, the information sought is not
otherwise accessible and the privilege is properly asserted, the party in
need of the information must either proceed without it or nullify the
effect of the privilege by removing the threat of incrimination. The
latter alternative may be accomplished by a grant of immunity.2 0
Whether or not an immunized witness can be constitutionally
compelled to testify depends on whether or not the protection provided
by the immunity is at least equivalent to the protection of the privilege
itself.2 The United States Supreme Court has applied this test to three
kinds of immunities: (1) transactional, (2) use, and (3) use and derivative use.
Transactional immunity bars prosecution of a witness for or on
account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he or she
testifies. The Court has consistently upheld the constitutional adequacy of transactional immunity.'
15. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
16. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892), disapproved on other grounds, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972).
17. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355 (1923).
18. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
19. For example, the privilege is not available if it has been waived, Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); nor is the privilege available to a corporation, United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
20. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The idea of granting a witness an appropriate immunity in order to compel his testimony was inherited from England and is found in
the colonial records of Pennsylvania and New York. L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 328, 359,
384-85, 402-03 (1968). The threat of incrimination may also be eliminated by the passage of
time. Since double jeopardy bars further prosecution of all offenses charged, a completed
criminal case that includes all possible charges leaves no possibility of further prosecution.
Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Yates v. Rundle,
326 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Similarly, if the statutes of limitations have ran as to all
possible criminal charges, the possibility of self-incrimination is removed. United States v.
Gebhard, 426 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1970).
21. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), disapprovedon othergrounds, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See Annot., 32 L. Ed. 2d 869 (1973).
22. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S.
141 (1931), disapprovedon other grounds in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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Unlike transactional immunity, use immunity does not logically
bar prosecution of the witness for the entire matter to which the witness
has testified. Use immunity precludes the prosecution only from "using" the compelled testimony. In Counselman v. Hitchcock,2 3 the

Supreme Court held that a statutory grant of use immunity was not the
equivalent of the Fifth Amendment privilege and that a witness who
had been granted only use immunity was entitled to stand mute.24 The
Court suggested that use immunity permitted the prosecution to investigate leads provided by the immunized testimony and to introduce evidence derived from those leads at a subsequent criminal trial.25 Such
derived evidence would not be available
to the prosecution if the wit26
testify.
to
compelled
not
ness were
As its name implies, use and derivative use immunity, like use immunity, bars introduction of the compelled testimony in a criminal
trial; unlike use immunity, it also bars introduction of derived evidence. Although dicta in Counselman27 and subsequent court decisions
had indicated that only transactional immunity was an adequate substitute for the privilege against self-incrimination, in Kasigar v. United
States28 the Supreme Court expressly disapproved that dicta2 9 and held
that a witness may be constitutionally compelled to testify when he has
received a statutory grant of use and derivative use immunity.30 The

reasoning underlying the Kastigar decision had been developed eight
years earlier in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,3" the first United
States Supreme Court case to imply an immunity in the absence of a
statutory grant.
H. Laying the Foundation: Immunity to Accommodate
Conflicting Governmental Interests
A. Murphy and Marchetti: The Supreme Court Immunity Decisions
In Mdurphy v. Waterfront Commission,32 the United States Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a civil contempt judgment entered against witnesses subpoenaed to testify at a New Jersey hearing
conducted by the bistate Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

142 U.S. 547 (1892).
Id.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 585-86.
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 462.
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Id.
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After refusing, on grounds of self-incrimination, to answer questions
concerning a work stoppage, the witnesses were granted immunity from
prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. Nonetheless, contending that their responses might be self-incriminating under
federal law, the witnesses persisted in their refusal and were cited for
contempt.33 On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
contempt and remanded the case. Justice Goldberg, writing for a fivejustice majority, announced the following constitutional rule: "[A]
state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be
incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its
fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection
with a criminal prosecution against him."3 Justice Goldberg then established a basis for a judicially granted immunity in the guise of an
"exclusionary rule."35
We conclude ... that in order to implement this constitutional

rule and accommodate the interests of the State and Federal
Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal
Government must be prohibited from making any such use of
compelled testimony and its fruits. This exclusionary rule, while
permitting the States to secure information necessary for effective
law enforcement, leaves the witness and the Federal Government
in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed
his privilege in the absence of a state grant of immunity.36
Although Justice Goldberg speaks of an "exclusionary rule,"37 the Murphy opinion actually creates an automatic immunity. An exclusionary
rule typically makes evidence inadmissible if law enforcement officers
obtain the evidence by means forbidden by a constitution, statute or
court rule.38 If, for instance, a witness in state court properly asserts his
privilege against self-incrimination and that court nonetheless successfully compels his testimony, the resulting testimony and its fruits would
33. Id. at 53-54.
34. Id. at 79.
35. See notes 37-43 and accompanying text infra.
36. 378 U.S. at 79 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id.
38. Oaks, Studying the ExclusionaryRule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665,
665 (1970). Professor Oaks found Supreme Court enforcement of an exclusionary rule "in
state and federal criminal proceedings as to four major types of violations: searches and
seizures that violate the fourth amendment, confessions obtained in violation of the fifth and
sixth amendments, identification testimony obtained in violation of these amendments, and
evidence obtained by methods so shocking that its use would violate the due process clause."
Id. at 665. Oaks cited five cases in support of this statement: United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (lineups); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (identifications); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confessions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(search and seizure); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) ("shocking" methods).
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be excluded at a subsequent criminal trial in federal court.3 9
Justice Goldberg's "exclusionary rule" was not intended as a rem-

edy to the testimonial consequences of a mistaken compulsion order,
for in Murphy no testimony in fact had been compelled.' The rule was
intended to permit a state court to compel testimony only when state
immunity had been expressly granted.4 1 Justice Goldberg's characteri-

zation has apparently led at least one trial court to believe mistakenly
that federal courts have authority to grant discretionary immunity.42
The Murphy holding, however, should not be viewed as an assurance
that appellate courts will treat a mistake in overruling a claim of privi-

lege as a trial court's discretionary grant of immunity. Justice
Goldberg's "exclusionary rule" is, in fact, a federal immunity that
arises automatically whenever state immunity is granted.43
39. See Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954) (dictum); Ellis v. United States,
416 F.2d 791, 795-96 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2270, at 417-19 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
In 4dams v. Mar.yland, a witness, Adams, appeared before a congressional committee
under summons and, upon examination, confessed to having run a gambling business in
Maryland. A statute had provided that no testimony of a witness in a congressional inquiry
"'shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in any ourt ... .'" 347
U.S. at 180 (footnote omitted). Notwithstanding the statute, the incriminating testimony
was used in state court to convict Adams of conspiring to violate Maryland's anti-lottery
laws. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Maryland conviction and held that the
federal immunity statute did not require Adams to object to each question on grounds of
self-incrimination. The Court stated, by way of dictum, "[A] witness does not need any
statute to protect him from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is compelled to give
over his objection. The Fifth Amendment takes care of that without a statute." Id. at 181,
quotedanddiscussedin Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 104 n.6 (1964) (White,
J., concurring). See also note 42 inyra.
40. 378 U.S. at 53-54. The Supreme Court remanded the case so that the petitioners
might answer the questions for which they had invoked their Fifth Amendment right of
silence. Id. at 80.
41. See id. at 79-80.
42. Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 795-97 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that a trial
judge in a criminal case cannot reject a claim of privilege on the ground that the ruling will
establish an immunity from subsequent prosecution). "We are confident [that the decision
below] was made in good faith, and can even discern how the judge may have come to a
mis-reading of Murphy. Nevertheless, his ruling was in the nature of a circular, self-fulfilling prophecy that in substance can only be viewed as a grant of immunity. That ruling was
outside the scope of judicial authority." Id. at 796. See also In re Corrugated Container
Anti-Trust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086, 1094 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867, 872 n. 1l
(7th Cir. 1979).
43. It has been held that federal courts have no discretion to grant immunity other than
as authorized by statute. See note 2 supra. The Murphy holding is not contrary, except
perhaps in the narrow sense that the Supreme Court exercised its own discretion in deciding
it. Although creating an automatic immunity without statutory authorization, Murphy did
not provide federal courts with discretion to grant immunity in specific instances.
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The technique used in Murphy to accommodate state and federal
law enforcement interests was considered by the Court for a similar
purpose in Marchetti v. United States.' Mr. Marchetti was convicted
in federal court for failing to register as a person engaged in the business of accepting wagers and for failing to pay an occupational tax required of such persons. He appealed his conviction and argued that the
statutory obligation to register violated his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination.4 5 On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the federal statute requiring the defendant to register as a
person engaged in the business of accepting wagers was
unconstitutional.4 6
In arguing the Marchetti case before the Supreme Court, the government suggested that the federal statutes in question could be saved
from constitutional attack "through the imposition of restrictions upon
the use by federal and state authorities of information obtained as a
consequence of compliance with the wagering tax requirements."'4 7
Justice Harlan, writing for five of a seven-member majority, agreed
that the government's suggestion was "in principle an attractive and
apparently practical resolution" to the problem of permitting the nation to exercise fully its taxing powers while protecting the Fifth
Amendment rights of its citizens.48 The Court concluded, however,
that imposing the suggested restrictions would be, in the circumstances
before the Court, "entirely inappropriate."4 9 The inappropriateness
was explained as follows:
The terms of the wagering tax system make quite plain that
Congress intended information obtained as a consequence of registration and payment of the occupational tax to be provided to
interested prosecuting authorities. This has evidently been the
consistent practice of the Revenue Service. We must therefore
assume that the imposition of use-restrictions would directly preclude effectuation of a significant element of Congress' purposes
in adopting the wagering taxes. Moreover, the imposition of such
restrictions would necessarily oblige state prosecuting authorities
to establish in each case that their evidence was untainted by any
connection with information obtained as a consequence of the
wagering taxes; the federal requirements would thus be protected
only at the cost of hampering, perhaps seriously, enforcement of
state prohibitions against gambling. We cannot know how Congress would assess the competing demands of the federal treasury
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

390 U.S. 39 (1968).
Id. at 41.
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
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and of state gambling prohibitions; we are, however, entirely certain that the Constitution has entrusted to Congress, and not to
this Court, the task of striking an appropriate balance among
such values. We therefore must decide that it would be improper
for the Court to impose restrictions of the kind urged by the
United States."
As shown by the above quoted explanation, in deciding not to extend a Murphy-like immunity to Marchetti, the Court engaged in a
two-step analysis. First, the Court addressed a narrow issue of legislative intent-whether or not Congress intended that information obtained pursuant to the statute be provided to interested prosecuting
authorities.' On the basis of the terms of the wagering tax statute and
the consistent practice of the Internal Revenue Service, the Court concluded that Congress had so intended. 2 Then the Court specifically
examined the impact of use restrictions upon enforcement of state
prohibitions against gambling. 53 In refusing to create an automatic immunity, the Court pointed out that imposing use restrictions "would
necessarily oblige state prosecuting authorities to establish in each case
that their evidence was untainted"5" and noted that the restrictions
would hamper, "perhaps seriously," state prosecution. 5
Before turning to the California Supreme Court's use of Murphy
and Marchetti, it should be noted that while the California court has
used these cases to protect the interests of private litigants, the immunity developed in Murphy and considered in Marchetti was advanced
to protect immediate governmental interests.
The grant of judicial immunity in Murphy was based on a traditional function of the Supreme Court-the accommodation of federal
and state law enforcement interests. 6 Before the Court granted certiorari, New Jersey and New York authorities already had imposed immunity. 57 The Court announced its "exclusionary rule" so that those
states and others could continue to use their own immunity laws "to
secure information necessary for effective law enforcement.15 8 Thus,
the Murphy holding directly promoted the interests of state law en50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 58-60 (footnotes omitted).
See 1d.
Id. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
390 U.S. at 59.
Id.
Id.
378 U.S. at 79; id. at 91-92 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 79.
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forcement in compelling evidence by restricting the use of state compelled evidence by federal prosecutors.59
The automatic immunity considered in Marchettialso involved an
accommodation of strictly governmental interests. In Marchetti, the
federal government proposed saving the federal statute requiring registration and payment of occupational taxes by persons engaged in the
business of accepting wagers. 60 The federal government's interests included raising tax revenues; the states' interest consisted of enforcing
state gambling prohibitions. 6
It is not surprising that in neither Murphy nor Marchetti did the
Court consider the interests of private parties in obtaining information.62 In Murphy, the Court insured the effectiveness of an order compelling testimony requested by a governmental commission, and in
Marchetti,the Court considered saving a federal statute compelling registration with the Internal Revenue Service.63 In both cases, the information sought was for the direct benefit of a public agency.
B. Byers: California's Adoption and Extension of Murphy
In 1969, the year following Marchetti, the California Supreme
Court drew upon the language of the wagering tax opinion to broaden
the scope of Murphy's judicially created immunity. This broadening
was accomplished in Byers v. Justice Court,' a decision that was subsequently65 vacated by the United States Supreme Court in California v.
Byers.

In a criminal prosecution, the state of California charged Mr. Byers with violating a "hit-and-run" statute. 66 The hit-and-ran law required the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in
property damage to stop at the scene of the accident and to provide the
owner or driver of the damaged property with certain identifying infor59. Id. Concerning whether or not state prosecutors are similarly bound by immunity
granted in federal court, compare Justice Goldberg's opinion for the Court, id. at 77-78 with
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, id. at 92 n.8.
60. 390 U.S. at 58.
61. Id.
62. See 390 U.S. at 58-60; 378 U.S. at 79.
63. See 390 U.S. at 58-60; 378 U.S. 52.
64. 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969).
65. 402 U.S. 424 (1971). To aid discussion, Byers refers to Byers v. Justice Court, 71
Cal. 2d 1039, 438 P.2d 965, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969), whereas California v. Byers, 402 U.S.
424 (1971), is referred to by the full case name. Although Byers was vacated, California
courts rely on Byers' justification for use restrictions because the United States Supreme
Court decision did not address the issue ofjudicially created immunity. See notes 94-97 and
accompanying text infra.
66. CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002(a) (West Supp. 1981).
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mation.67 The state also charged Byers with unsafe passing.6" In the
course of litigation, counsel stipulated "that the alleged improper passing caused the accident from which Byers assertedly
departed without
69
providing statutorily required information."

Byers demurred to the hit-and-run charge on the basis that the
section requiring him to stop and identify himself violated his privilege
against self-incrimination. After the justice court overruled the demurrer, the superior court granted a writ of prohibition in favor of the defendant, and the state appealed.7"
The California Supreme Court held that the hit-and-run law compelled Byers to incriminate himself. 1 The court, however, did not declare the law unconstitutional. Instead, it chose to save the statute by
imposing use restrictions such as had been employed in Murphy and
discussed in Marchetti. The court precluded state prosecutors from using evidence in a criminal prosecution against a motorist when the evidence was derived from the motorist's compliance with the hit-and-run
law. 72 In stating its decision, the court expressly considered whether or
not it had authority to impose use restrictions and concluded that it
73
did.
The court was faced with three alternative ways to decide the case:
(1) to rule that the hit-and-run statute was constitutional, (2) to rule
that the statute was unconstitutional and unenforceable, or (3) to save
the statute by relying on Murphy and Marchetti.
The first alternative, given that Byers enjoyed a Fifth Amendment
right to refuse to stop, was untenable. The Constitution does not tolerate imposing criminal sanctions as a consequence of properly invoking
the privilege against self-incrimination. 74 If the hit-and-run statute in

Byers had resulted merely in noncriminal consequences, the court
might have found both that Byers was privileged to refuse to stop and
67. 71 Cal. 2d at 1041, 458 P.2d at 467, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 555; see CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 20002(a) (West Supp. 1981).
68. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21750 (West Supp. 1981).
69. 71 Cal. 2d at 1042, 458 P.2d at 467, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1047-49, 458 P.2d at 471-72, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 558-60.
72. See id. at 1055-56, 458 P.2d at 476-77, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 564-65.
73. See id. at 1050, 1056-57, 458 P.2d at 473, 476-77, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 561, 564-65.
74. Concerning sanctions for exercising the privilege, see Berger, Burdening the Ffth
Amendment: Toward A Re~slmptive Barrier Theory, 70 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 27
(1979); Noonan, Inferencesfrom the Invocationofthe PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 41
VA. L. REv. 311 (1955); Ratner, ConsequencesofExercisingthe PrivilegeAgainstSeif-Incrimination, 24 U. CHm. L. REv. 472 (1957); Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Ffth Amendment: The Burger Court's Defnition, 61 MINN.L. Rnv. 383 (1977).
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that the "juristic consequence" of the refusal was appropriate.7 5 Since,

however, the consequences of asserting the privilege included a criminal sanction, the Fifth Amendment76 would not tolerate enforcement of
the hit-and-run statute as written.

The second alternative-to rule the hit-and-run statute unconstitutional and unenforceable-was highly undesirable. If the statute were
unenforceable, no criminal sanctions would lie where a motorist unlawfully causes a property-damaging accident and does not stop. The
77
second option would be nothing less than hit-and-run with impunity.
Because this second option would have resulted in the loss of an
important criminal sanction, the court's choice of the third optionsaving the hit-and-run law by implying an automatic immunity-was
warranted. In choosing to save a criminal statute and to impose on the
prosecution the burden of use restrictions, the court relied on Murphy.78 That reliance was not, however, what one might expect. The
surprise lay in the court's tacit refusal to treat Byers as requiring an
accommodation between law enforcement interests.
While Murphy involved disclosure of information to the government for a direct benefit of the government, Byers, according to the
California Supreme Court, involved the disclosure of personal identity
to the owner of injured property.79 Ignoring any direct interest of law
enforcement in the hit-and-run statute, the court stated that the purpose of the required disclosure was "to protect property owners from
financial loss. ' ' 80 Murphy addressed governmental interests, whereas
75. In civil cases, California courts have recognized appropriate "juristic consequences"
of invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. See Sheppard v. Superior Court, 17
Cal. 3d 107, 116-17, 550 P.2d 161, 171-72, 130 Cal. Rptr. 257, 267-68 (1976) (dicta that a
claim of privilege gives rise to an adverse inference in a civil proceeding); Talcott, Inc. v.
Short, 100 Cal. App. 3d 504, 509-10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 63, 66 (1979) (affirming a summary
judgment for plaintiff where defendants had claimed their privilege in the course of discovery and had failed to extricate themselves from the dilemma created by invoking the privilege); A & M Records v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 567, 142 Cal. Rptr. 390, 398 (1977)
(affirming a judgment for plaintiff where the defendant was precluded from testifying at trial
concerning matters upon which he had asserted in discovery his privilege against self-incrimination), appealdismissed,436 U.S. 952, rehearingdenied, 439 U.S. 884 (1978). But see
CAL. EvID. CODE § 913 (West 1966).
76. Compare Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976) with Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
77. Ifa hit-and-run statute concerning property-damaging accidents is unconstitutional,
a similar statute concerning injury accidents would seem equally deficient, for example,
CAL. VEH. CODE § 20001 (West Supp. 1981).
78. 71 Cal. 2d at 1050, 458 P.2d at 473, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
79. Id. at 1041-42, 1047-48, 458 P.2d at 467-68, 471-72, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56, 559-60.
80. Id. at 1048, 458 P.2d at 472, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
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Byers, as initially characterized by the court, concerned private
interests.
Having chosen first to treat the hit-and-run statute in terms of private interests and to ignore governmental interests in the criminal sanction itself, the California Supreme Court then tied Byers to Murphy by
focusing on the government's interest in a more general form. Of Byers, the court stated,
The present case exemplifies. . . the conflict between the individual's right to protection under the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and the government's substantial interest in having citizens report or otherwise divulge information to
effectuate various regulatory measures designed to promote the
public welfare."1
Thus, by emphasizing "the government's substantial interest in having
citizens report or otherwise divulge information," the court linked its
decision to Murphy and glossed over the distinction between reporting
to a private party and reporting to the government. By ignoring the
government's direct interest in the criminal sanction and by stating that
the purpose of the hit-and-run law was "to protect property owners
from financial loss,"82 the court enhanced the precedential value of its
implied immunity. The court steered what had begun in Murphy as an
accommodation between federal and state law enforcement interests towards a new accommodation in which law enforcement interests yield
to the needs of private civil litigants.
This emphasis on the government's general interest in reporting or
divulging also linked Byers to Marchetti, since Marchetti also dealt
with statutory disclosure requirements. By suggesting that Mr. Byers'
disclosure was made pursuant to a "regulatory" measure "designed to
promote the public welfare," the court brought Byers within the scope
of the Supreme Court's analysis in the Marchettiwagering tax decision.
The California court sought to rely on the language of Marchetti
while distinguishing that decision on its facts. As did the majority
opinion in Marchetti,the court couched its analysis in terms of legislative intent and "hampering effect." 83 In analyzing legislative intent, the
California court stated that the hit-and-run law in Byers, unlike the
81. Id. at 1049, 458 P.2d at 472, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 560. See generally, as cited in Byers,
id, Mansfield, The.41bertson Case: Conflict Between the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
and the Government'sNeedfor Information, 1966 SuP. CT. REv. 103; McKay, supra note 1,
at 204-32; Note, Required Information and the Pivilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 681 (1965).
82. 71 Cal. 2d at 1048, 458 P.2d at 472, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
83. Id. at 1050-52, 458 P.2d at 474-76, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 562-64.
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federal wagering tax law in Marchetti,was intended to facilitate disclosures for only noncriminal purposes.8 4 Since neither the hit-and-run

law itself nor any encompassing legislative scheme was designed to facilitate ancillary criminal prosecutions, the legislature's intentions
would not be contradicted by restricting the prosecutors' use of information derived from a compelled stop. Moreover, since there was no
conflicting federal interest, California lawmakers were free to enact legislation permitting use of this information in criminal cases if they dis-

agreed with the court's statutory interpretation.85
Concerning the "hampering effect" of the proposed use and derivative use immunity, 86 the court in Byers again distinguished Marchetti.

The court's analysis first focused on the particular zone of state prosecutions in which hampering was foreseen. A large portion of state wagering-related violators was subject to the disclosure requirements of
Marchetti. In contrast, a far lesser portion of violators of criminal laws
pertaining to the highway was involved in property damage and was
thus subject to the "disclosure requirements" of the hit-and-run law in
Byers. By the California court's analysis, the imposition of use restric-

tions in Marchetti thus would have had "a much more sweeping effect"
than did the analogous imposition in Byers. 7
In distinguishing the hampering effect found in Byers with that
discussed in Marchetti, the court also noted that the Byers restrictions

would not be imposed across jurisdictional lines. In Marchetti,the federal government had urged the United States Supreme Court to impose

a use restriction on state prosecution.88 In Byers, on the other hand, the
84. In Marchetti, information obtained through the wagering tax laws was statutorily
required to be provided to state and federal prosecuting authorities. 390 U.S. at 46-48.
85. 71 Cal. 2d at 1054-55, 458 P.2d at 475-76, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64. If legislation were
enacted permitting the use of evidence compelled by the hit-and-run law, then "the privilege
could be claimed in appropriate situations." Id. at 1055, 458 P.2d at 476, 80 Cal. Rptr. at
564. Concerning judicial review that avoids couching a judicial solution to a constitutional
problem in absolute terms and which permits a legislature to find an alternative course, see
L. LUsKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S PowER TO RE-

VISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975).

86. That its proposed immunity was not transactional was important to the court's analysis of hampering effect: "[A]n excessive concern for the government's burden of showing
that evidence used in a prosecution is untainted is inherently at odds with the Supreme
Court's recently clarified basic position that immunity sufficient to justify compelling a disclosure otherwise privileged need not be complete immunity from prosecution." 71 Cal. 2d
at 1052-53, 458 P.2d at 474, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 562. It seems fair to say that the California
Supreme Court could not have been as free-wheeling in Byers or in subsequent decisions
had the Supreme Court not lightened the immunity vehicle to its current use and derivative
use form.
87. Id. at 1056, 458 P.2d at 476, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
88. 390 U.S. at 58-59.
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California court saw "no problem of conflicting state and federal interests." 8 9 There would be no hampering of federal interests since "it is

the state which both demands disclosure of information in 'hit-and-run'
accidents and prosecutes those who commit criminal acts on the
highways. '' 90

On petition by the state, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and vacated the California decision. 91 In a four-member plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that California's hit-and-run
statute did not compel Byers to disclose testimonial information tend-

ing to incriminate himself.9' By refusing to accept the premise that
Byers was privileged not to stop, the Supreme Court was free to avoid
the issue of the California court's use restrictions and their
consequences. 93
Although the ultimate holding of Byers v. Justice Court was over-

turned, California courts have continued to rely on that part of Byers
which the United States Supreme Court did not address-its justification for use restrictions on the basis of Murphy and Marchetti.94 The
capacity of California courts to graft judicially created immunity onto
various species of civil litigation grew from the court's reliance in Byers
on those two Supreme Court decisions. Indeed, California courts have
claimed that "[tjhe high court did not disagree with California's judicial declaration of immunity." 95 This claim is misleading at best; it
seems fair to say that in removing the premise upon which the Byers

restrictions rested, the Supreme Court was acting, at least in part, to
avoid sustaining an immunity of which it did not approve. While the
89. 71 Cal. 2d at 1055, 458 P.2d at 476, 80 CaL Rptr. at 564.
90. Id. In fact, the use restrictions of Byers could hamper federal prosecutions. If a
motorist has driven a stolen vehicle across state lines or has committed some other federal
offense, an obeyed requirement that he or she stop after an accident might produce evidence
relevant in federal courts. Perhaps in recognition of this problem, the court may have attempted to limit its use restrictions to state prosecutions for accident-related crimes. "[W]e
...hold that where compliance with § 20002 of the Vehicle Code would otherwise be excused by an assertion of the privilege, compliance is, as in other cases, mandatory and state
prosecuting authorities are precluded from using the information disclosed as a result of
compliance or its fruits in connection with any criminal prosecution related to the accident."
Id. at 1056-57, 458 P.2d at 477, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
91. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
92. Id. at 427, 431-32.
93. See Id. at 425-27, 427 n.3; id. at 434, 458 (Harlan, J., concurring).
94. See, eg., Daly v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 132, 143-44 & n.5, 560 P.2d 1193, 120001 & n.5, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14,21-22 & n.5 (1977); People v. Superior Court (Kaufman), 12 Cal.
3d 421, 428-29, 525 P.2d 716, 720-21, 115 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816-17 (1974); Tarantino v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d 465, 470, 122 Cal. Rptr. 61, 63 (1975).
95. DeCamp v. First Kensington Corp., 83 Cal. App. 3d 268, 147 Cal. Rptr. 869, 876
(1978); Tarantino v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d 465, 470, 122 Cal. Rptr. 61, 63 (1975).
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Supreme Court's four-member plurality did not expressly consider the
issue of judicially declared immunity, Justice Harlan squarely addressed this issue in a concurring opinion.96 This article considers Justice Harlan's discussion97 after first examining how the California
Supreme Court built upon Byers to authorize discretionary immunities
in civil litigation.

II.
A.

Judicially Created Immunities in the Civil Context

People v. Superior Court (Kaufma)

In 1974, three years after Caiffornia v. Byers, the California
Supreme Court relied on Byers v. Justice Court to find authority for
discretionary immunity in the context of civil discovery. In People v.
Superior Court (Kaufman),98 the state brought a civil action against
Kaufman and others, alleging that the defendants had engaged in consumer fraud and unfair competition. The state took the oral deposition
of defendant Kaufman and questioned him about the alleged fraud; he
refused to answer, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination.9 9
The state moved for an order limiting use of the deposition to the
civil proceeding and providing "an effective grant of immunity. ' ' 100
The superior court denied the motion on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to make such an order. The state ultimately sought a writ
from the California Supreme Court and contended that California
Code of Civil Procedure section 2019(b)(1) grants the trial court the
necessary jurisdiction. 1 Section 2019(b)(1), which is part of California's civil discovery law, relates to oral depositions; it provides in part,
"the court may make any.., order which justice requires to protect
96. See 402 U.S. at 434-59.
97. See notes 152-59 and accompanying text infa.
98. 12 Cal. 3d 421, 525 P.2d 716, 115 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
99. Id. at 424, 525 P.2d at 718, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
100. Id. at 425, 525 P.2d at 718, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
101. Id.; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1) (West Supp. 1981). The court in Kaufman's
reliance on § 2019(b)(1) for granting immunity has been criticized for its failure to show how
an immunity order protects a party or witness from "annoyance, embarrassment or oppression." See Note, Immunity GranisforDiscoveryin PrivateCivilLitigation,66 CAuF. L. REv.
233, 238-39 (1978). But see Note, New Limitationson the Privilege 4gainst Self-Incrimination, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 554, 558-60 (1976). In Daly v. Superior Court the California
Supreme Court explained that "[t]he protective order approved in Kaufman was not for the
benefit of the witness, who would have preferred to stand on the privilege, but was for the
protection of the right of the party seeking the order (the People) to obtain discovery without
being blocked by a claim of privilege that the protection order could effectively dispel" 19
Cal. 132 at 147 n.9, 560 P.2d 1193 at 1203 n.9, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 at 24 n.9 (1977) (citation
omitted). For the federal rule analogous to § 2019(b)(1), see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See also
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2035-2044 (1970).
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the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression."
The court held that section 2019(b)(1) vests the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a protective order providing Kaufman with use and derivative use immunity.10 2 A peremptory writ then was issued directing the
trial court to fashion a protective order and to compel Kaufman "to
respond on deposition and trial10 3 to all proper inquiries including
except for the protective order, would tend to incriminate
those which,
104
him."
Unlike the immunity proposed in Marchettiand declared in Byers,
the immunity authorized in Kaufman was neither automatic nor
designed to save an otherwise unconstitutional statute. The Kaufman
grant was a discretionary protective order authorized to facilitate discovery.10° In finding authority for this immunity, the court in Kaufman
rested its decision on section 2019(b)(1) and Byers v. Justice Court.
The court's interpretation of section 2019(b)(1) consisted of three
parts. First, the court relied on precedent which indicated that section
2019(b)(1) vests discretion in the trial court to control the scope and use
1°6
of a deposition in circumstances arguably analogous to Kaufman.
Next, it distinguished decisions which suggested that immunity could
not be granted unless rooted in specific legislative authorization distinct
from the general authorization of section 2019(b)(1). I°7 Finally, the
court turned to Byers for the general principle that immunity may be
implied from a statute and that no express statutory authorization is
required.'10 The court, however, not only drew from this general principle of Byers to establish in Kaufman that the trial court has discretionary authority to grant immunity, but also employed the criteria
used in Byers for the imposition of automatic use restrictions.10 9 In
doing so, the court incorporated into a discretionary context the criteria
for implying an automatic immunity.
102. 12 Cal. 3d at 429, 433, 525 P.2d at 721, 724, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 817, 820.
103. Concerning the extension of the order beyond the deposition to trial and the use of
§ 2019(b)(1) outside the context of a deposition, see note 183 infra.
104. 12 Cal. 3d at 433, 525 P.2d at 724, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
105. The grant, it seems, was more than authorized-it was required. The trial court was
left with no discretion other than the fashioning of the precise order. Id. Presumably, the
record before the California Supreme Court established that the plaintiff in Kaufman was
entitled to a protective order and that a refusal to issue the order would have been an abuse
of discretion.
106. Id. at 425-26, 525 P.2d at 718-19, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
107. Id. at 426-28, 525 P.2d at 719-20, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
108. Id. at 427-28, 525 P.2d at 720-21, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
109. Id. at 428-29, 525 P.2d at 721, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
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In Byers, the California Supreme Court had couched its use restriction analysis in Marchetti's language concerning the hampering of
criminal prosecutions and the determination of legislative intent. 11 0
With respect to legislative intent, the court had built on Marchetti by
suggesting that if the legislature disagreed with the court's implied immunity, the lawmakers were free to enact contrary legislation."' In
Katffman, the court summarized Byers in the following terms:
It was concluded in Byers that as the imposition of use restrictions would not (1) frustrate any apparent legislative purpose
behind the "hit and run" statute, (2) unduly hamper criminal
prosecutions of drivers involved in such accidents, or (3) preclude
the Legislature from overriding the judicial grant of immunity if
it wished to do so, the court was authorized to grant immunity
and impose a proper use limitation without infringing constitutional rights against self-incrimination and notwithstanding the
absence of any specific legislative authorization." 2
In applying the Byers rationale, the court in Kaufman concluded
first that the requested immunity grant "would not frustrate but would
3
further the legislative purpose of suppressing deceptive advertising,"11
and second that the immunity grant would not unduly hamper the
prosecution of persons who, in the judgment of law enforcement officials, should be subjected to criminal proceedings." 4 Finally, as in Byers, the court stated that if its statutory interpretation "does not
conform to legislative intent, [the legislature] remains free to redefine
the limits of authorization.""' 5
In applying the three criteria of Byers, the court in Kaufman ostensibly was determining only whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction under section 2019(b)(1) to grant immunity. In fact, however,
without discussing further the propriety of an immunity grant, the
court ruled that an immunity order should issue." 6 The failure of the
Kaufman court to go beyond the expressed jurisdictional issue and to
discuss the discretional propriety of the protective order suggests that
the court collapsed into a single discussion the issues of jurisdiction and
discretion." 7 Of the three points considered in that discussion, only the
110. See notes 83-90 and accompanying text supra.
111. 71 Cal. 2d at 1056, 458 P.2d at 477, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
112. 12 Cal. 3d at 428, 525 P.2d at 721, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 817 (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 428-29, 525 P.2d at 721, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
114. Id. at 429, 525 P.2d at 721, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 429-33, 525 P.2d at 721-24, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 817-20.
117. See People v. Superior Court (Taylor), 53 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1001, 126 Cal. Rptr.
297, 300 (1975) (reversing a trial court that in the course of discovery in a civil action, refused to grant immunity upon the People's request, and stating, "Kaufman intimates that the
trial court has no discretion to flatly refuse to immunize a defendant against prosecution").
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first two-conformity with legislative intent and absence of undue
hampering of criminal prosecutions--seem to have application beyond
the jurisdictional issue. 1 8 Both these elements of the Byers rationale
were inherited from the language of Marchetti and here were applied
as apparent criteria for granting a discretionary protective order in the
course of civil litigation. The second criterion, the absence of undue
hampering, received only cursory consideration. Presumably, the court
did not consider hampering of criminal prosecutions a problem, since
the state itself both had brought the action and had requested the immunity order. 19 That the second criterion would require elaboration
became apparent in Daly v. Superior Court. 20
B. Dafy v. Superior Court
In Dao, the plaintiffs filed an action for wrongful death and other
torts 12 1 against certain labor organizations and union personnel. Having alleged that the defendants killed the decedent because he had refused to participate in a newspaper strike,' 22 the plaintiffs proceeded to
depose certain individual defendants. In the course of these depositions, each of the defendants, like Mr. Kaufman in the prior case, invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. The plaintiffs responded
by asking the superior court to grant an immunity order nullifying the
claim of privilege asserted by the deponents. When the trial court denied their request, the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate directing issuance of an immunity order."2
In seeking the writ from the California Supreme Court, the plaintiffs relied on Kaufman. The California Supreme Court distinguished
Kaufman, noting that the Daly litigation was between private parBut f Rysdale v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 280, 146 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1978) (holding
that in a zoning violation action brought by the city of Santa Barbara, a city requested
immunity grant to only two of several defendants was an abuse of discretion).
118. The third point, that the legislature should remain free to "redefine the limits of [the
court's] authorization," 12 Cal. 3d at 429, 525 P.2d at 721, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 817, seems a
consideration in statutory interpretation rather than in application of a predefined statute.
119. See Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that the state
attorney general in a related action conceded that the deposition testimony he was seeking
would be tainted by prior grand jury testimony). See also In re Corrugated Container AntiTrust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086, 1092 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that the concession in
Starkey may have operated as a grant of immunity where the state attorney general was
"the only potential prosecutor").
120. 19 Cal. 3d 132, 560 P.2d 1193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977).
121. Plaintiffs sought damages for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress
as well as for wrongful death. Id. at 138, 560 P.2d at 1197, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
122. Id. at 138-39, 560 P.2d at 1197, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
123. See 1d. at 137-39, 560 P.2d at 1196-97, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
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ties. 24 While in Kaufman, the state had chosen both to file a civil action and subsequently to seek an immunity order, in Daly neither the
decision to file nor the decision
to seek immunity had been made by a
125
representative of the State.

The court in Daly stated that prosecuting authorities have an interest in any decision to grant immunity to a deponent, 126 observing that
in any subsequent criminal proceeding the prosecution would bear the
"heavy burden" of proving that its evidence was untainted by testimony compelled under an immunity grant. 2 7 The court concluded
that "to interpose such an obstacle to criminal proceedings over the
objection of prosecuting authorities would ' constitute
improper judicial
28
discretion."'
prosecutorial
with
interference
The court held that in order to avoid improper judicial interference, use and derivative use immunity129 under section 2019(b)(1)
should not be granted unless detailed conditions are met. Although the
conditions Daly placed on the granting of immunity cannot be found in
Kaufman, the criteria used in Kaufman were not repudiated. In Daly,
as in the prior decision, conformity with legislative intent and the absence of undue hampering of criminal prosecutions constituted the criteria for determining
both the jurisdiction and the propriety of an
30
immunity grant.
124. Id. at 138, 560 P.2d at 1197, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
125. Id. Although both the California Attorney General and the Appellate Committee
of the California District Attorneys Association had filed amicus briefs, id. at 141 n.3, 560
P.2d at 1199 n.3, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 20 n.3, no representative of the state had appeared before
the trial court, id. at 138, 560 P.2d at 1197, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1972)).
128. Id.
129. The court noted that use and derivative use immunity was sufficient to replace the
privilege against self-incrimination and rejected the argument that § 2016(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which limits the right of discovery to matters "not privileged,"
bars discovery from a witness protected by such immunity. See 19 Cal. 3d at 142-43, 151,
560 P.2d at 1200, 1205, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 21, 26. For arguments that use and derivative use
immunity is insufficient to replace the privilege, see generally Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441,462-71 (1972) (Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Strachan, Se/f-Incriminalon,
Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEx. L. REv. 791 (1978). For the view that § 2016(b) may bar
discovery notwithstanding a grant of immunity, see Note, Immunity Grantsfor Discovery in
Private Civil Litigation, 66 CAUF. L. REv. 233, 238-39 (1978); Note, New Limitationson the
PrivilegeAgainst Se/-Incrmination, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 554, 558-60 (1976).
130. The third criterion inherited from Byers--that the legislature not be precluded from
overriding the authorization of the immunity grant-was not mentioned in Day. Perhaps
the absence of this third factor reflects an emphasis on application of a pre-established statutory interpretation. If the distinction between criteria for jurisdiction under § 2019(b)(1) and
criteria for the exercise of discretion under that section is more than semantics, the emphasis
of Daoy seems to rest with the latter. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
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The absence of undue hampering of criminal prosecutions was the
principal concern in Daly.13 1 In the context of the hit-and-run statute
in Byers, any use restrictions, by necessity, arose automatically; the
court did not have the option of developing rules to protect prosecution
interests or to limit the granting of immunity. 132 Though the grant was
discretionary in Kaufman, the court apparently saw no immediate need
to develop rules protecting prosecutorial interests, possibly because the
request for use restrictions had been made by a representative of the
state. 133 The court in DaOy, however, was justifiably concerned that if
use restrictions were available to private litigants without specific protections, the public's interest in effective prosecution of crime would be
jeopardized.
In formulating conditions for discretionary use restrictions, the
court declined the proposals both of the plaintiffs, who favored easy
access to use restrictions, and of amid curiae, who represented law enforcement interests and were protective of traditional prosecutorial prerogatives. The plaintiff had suggested that prosecutorial interests
would be adequately protected by an order sealing disclosed information so that statements otherwise privileged would not be disclosed beyond the confines of the civil suit.' 3 4 In rejecting this proposal, the
court noted that further evidence may be developed on the basis of
sealed testimony and that ultimately, at time of trial, both sealed evidence and its fruits may be introduced. 35 The court stated that the
existence and possible availability of such evidence could force prosecutors to prove that their own evidence is untainted, and the court de131. The court also expressed concern for legislative intent but related this concern to the
issue of hampering criminal prosecutions. Plaintiffs had argued that the trial court was compelled to grant immunity under the general rule that discovery statutes are to be liberally
construed in favor of disclosure in the absence of a well-established cause for denial. See
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 377-78, 364 P.2d 266, 276, 15 Cal. Rptr.
90, 100 (1961). In response to plaintiffs' argument, the court stated in Daly, "[W]e do not
find in the discovery statutes any legislative preference for imposing the burdens of use
immunity upon prosecuting authorities whenever necessary to the obtaining of discovery by
private parties." 19 Cal. 3d at 144, 560 P.2d at 1201, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 22. Although rejecting the plaintiffs' extreme view of legislative preference, the court reached its holding "in
light of the legislative policies promotive of discovery." Id. at 147, 560 P.2d at 1202, 137
Cal. Rptr. at 23.
132. The dilemma of an accident-involved motorist is immediate. The motorist must
either stop and thus subject himself to possible criminal charges or drive on and thereby
violate the hit-and-run law. The motorist's choice must be made promptly and does not
permit judicial or prosecutorial participation.
133. See 12 Cal. 3d at 425, 525 P.2d at 717-18, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 813-14.
134. Daly, 19 Cal. 3d at 145, 560 P.2d at 1201, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
135. Id., 560 P.2d at 1201-02, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
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clined to impose this burden on them.1 36 The court also declined the
suggestion of the California Attorney General and the California District Attorneys Association that the request of a prosecuting agency is a
precondition of an immunity grant. Although noting that in California
a prosecution request is statutorily required for a grant of transactional
1 37 the court stated that
immunity to a witness in a criminal proceeding,
1 38
in a civil context no such request is required.
To accommodate both the private interest of a civil litigant and the
public interest in effective prosecution, the court in Daly constructed a
set of procedural rules for discretionary immunity. Under these judicially created rules, prior to the issuance of use restrictions, the party
seeking the order has the burden of notifying three prosecution agen-

cies: (1) the district attorney of the county, 139 (2) the California Attorney General, and (3) the United States Attorney for the district in
which the county is located. 140 In order that prosecutors may know the
scope of the immunity sought, each notice must state "the subject matter of the inquiries to which the witness' answers are to be immunized
from use or derivative use."1 41 Further, the statement, when incorporated into an ultimate immunity order, must "provide the witness with
a clear guide to what questions are within and what are without the
136. Id.
137. Id. at 146, 560 P.2d at 1202, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 23. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1324,
1324.1 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981). Cf. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(Burger, J.)(holding that a judicial creation of witness immunity rights for a criminal defendant would violate principles of separation of powers), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967);
Note, Defense Witness Immunity, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199 (1981); Note, "The Public
Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence':" The Defendant's ConstitutionalRight to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1211 (1978) (arguing that a criminal defendant, like the prosecution, should have the right to request and obtain witness immunity). But cf. Earl,361 F.2d
at 534 n. I (dicta that such witness immunity rights nonetheless may be available in narrow
circumstances).
138. 19 Cal. 3d at 147, 560 P.2d at 1202, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 23. "The protection of
prosecutorial interests in the granting of use and derivative use immunity in aid of discovery
by a private litigant lies not in any rigid requirement of a prosecutorial request for immunity
but in the more general condition stated in Kaufman andByers that the granting of immunity not 'unduly hamper' subsequent criminal prosecutions." Id.
139. The court in Daly did not specify which county; presumably, it is the county where
the civil action is pending. If criminal charges could be brought in one or more counties, the
California Attorney General could be expected to notify other district attorneys as necessary. Id. at 149 & n.14, 560 P.2d at 1204 & n.14, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 25 & n.14. Additionally,
"the trial court can exercise its ... discretion to require that notice be sent to one or more
designated prosecuting officials [including district attorneys, city attorneys, and city prosecutors]." Id. at 149-50 n.14, 560 P.2d 1204 n.14, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.14.
140. Id. at 149, 560 P.2d at 1204, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
141. Id. at 148, 560 P.2d at 1203, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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immunity grant."' 4 2

Once notice is received by the essential agencies,
the burden of objecting to the proposed grant rests with the prosecutors. 143 After adequate notice, if no prosecutor objects to the proposal,
the immunity order may issue.144
To protect the interests of law enforcement, the court in Daly
stated that if a prosecuting attorney does object to the proposed grant
and supports the objection with a proper declaration, the court may not
grant immunity. In his declaration, the prosecuting attorney must state

"that he is familiar with the notice and has reasonable grounds to believe that the proposed grant of immunity might unduly hamper the
prosecution of a criminal proceeding."1 4 The court specifically noted
that undue hampering may be found in either a current or future criminal proceeding" 4 and that the trial court may not require a prosecutor
"to amplify or justify the submitted declaration" 147 or "to assess the
nature or degree of the impact the immunity grant would have upon
prosecutorial functions."' 148 The court stated that if a private litigant
considers a prosecutor's objection unjustified, the litigant's remedy is
either to persuade the prosecutor to withdraw the objection, to reframe
the proposed immunity order, or to postpone examination of the wit49
ness until the grounds for claiming the privilege have been removed.'
C. A Critique of Byers and Xauftma in Light of Daly

Daly is a welcome development in California law. The Daly rules
for discretionary use restrictions are well designed to balance relevant
interests. The procedure provides civil litigants whose discovery has
been blocked by a valid claim of privilege with an opportunity, though
not a guarantee, of obtaining needed information. While private interests in discovery yield to governmental interests where a prosecutor
properly objects to a granting of use restrictions, in many cases objection should be unnecessary. Even where a prosecutor initially objects,
the requesting party has created an opportunity for discussion. In some
cases, the mere fact of notice may enable an agency to insulate an in142. Id.
143. Id. An alternative policy of requiring an affirmative request from a prosecution
agency is regarded by the court as impractical. Consideration of matters pertaining to private litigation "is not one of the official duties to which busy prosecuting attorneys feel
constrained to devote their attention." .d.
144. d.
145. Id. at 148, 560 P.2d at 1203-04, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25.
146. Id. at 148 & n.12, 560 P.2d at 1204 & n.12, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 25 & n.12.
147. Id. at 148, 560 P.2d at 1204, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 149 & n.13, 560 P.2d at 1204 & n.13, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 25 & n.13.
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vestigation from possible taint. Although the prosecutor's ultimate decision is not subject to direct judicial review, the prosecutor has an
ethical obligation to act in furtherance of justice.1 50 By demonstrating
both the unfair consequences of his or her opponent's claim of privilege
and a willingness to assist in protecting prosecution interests, the requesting party may persuade a prosecutor to withdraw an initial
objection.
In light of Daly, the law created by Kaufman may require refinement. While Kaufman permits the trial court to protect the interests of
all immediate parties, the decision fails to protect the interests of prosecution agencies not before the court. It may be argued, therefore, that
the Daly requirements should apply equally to the Kaufman context.
On the other hand, informal cooperation between federal, state and lo-

cal prosecutors may remove any need for the formal notice and objection rights found in Daly.151
In comparing Daly with Byers, the latter displays a relative lack of
concern for the impact of automatic use restrictions on criminal prosecutions. This negative impact is squarely addressed in Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Californiav. Byers.'52 The California court's use
restrictions would, he writes, "significantly impair the State's capacity
to prosecute drivers whose illegal behavior caused accidents."'5 3 In responding to Justice Brennan, who would affirm the California decision,
Harlan states:
150. "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate;
his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1979).
151. Arguably, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), would confer use
and derivative use immunity in federal court where a state prosecutor, without notice to
federal authorities, obtains a state immunity grant pursuant to Kaufman. See 19 Cal. 3d at
150,560 P.2d at 1205, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 26; Tarantino v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d 465,
470, 122 Cal. Rptr. 61, 63 (1975); City of New York v. Marchese, 74 Misc. 2d 367, 343
N.Y.S. 2d 547 (1973).
152. As Justice Harlan's vote was necessary to the five-to-four decision, his concurring
opinion, 402 U.S. at 464, refutes the claim that the Supreme Court "did not disagree with
California's judicial declaration of immunity [in Byers] ... ." Tarantino v. Superior
Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d 465, 471, 122 Cal. Rptr. 61, 63 (1975). See note 95 and accompanying text supra. Harlan's opinion has won praise for its intelligence and candor. See Meltzer,
PrivilegesAgainst Self-Incriminationand the Hit-and-Run Opinions, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 3.
See also C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 142, at 303 n.85 (2d ed. 1972) ("In
view of the strong arguments that can be made against the reasoning of the plurality opinion
... Justice Harlan's analysis seems more satisfactory and consistent with Fifth Amendment
policies"). Justice Harlan was the author of the majority opinion in United States v.
Marchetti, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). See notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra.
153. 402 U.S. at 447.
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Apparently my Brother Brennan maintains that imposition of a
use restriction in the circumstances of this case will not, in fact,
significantly interfere with the State's ability to enforce criminal
sanctions relating to driving behavior where that behavior
culminates in an accident causing property damage.
That is a most difficult position to maintain. By compelling
Byers to stop, the State compelled Byers to focus official attention
on himself in circumstances which, I agree, involved for Byers a
substantial risk of self-incrimination. In this circumstance, the
State, if it is to prosecute Byers after the coerced stop, will bear
the burden of proving that the State could have selected Byers
out from the general citizenry for prosecution even if he had not
stopped. With respect to automobile drivers, that would be a
heavy burden indeed. I doubt this burden could be met in most
cases of this sort consistent with a good-faith judicial application
of the rules
relating to proof of an independent source of
54
evidence.
By adopting a balancing approach, Justice Harlan ultimately concludes that the purposes of the Fifth Amendment do not warrant imposition of use restrictions as a condition on the enforcement of the hitand-run statute.1 55 The consequences of imposing such use restrictions,
in fact, force Harlan to take this position notwithstanding the "substantial risk of self-incrimination" '56 imposed by the hit-and-run law.
Would Justice Harlan similarly have opposed the immunity grant
in Day? While Justice Harlan opposed the Byers automatic immunity,
his balancing approach leaves open the possibility of use restrictions in
other circumstances. 1 57 If the Supreme Court today were faced with
the discretionary immunity grant of Day, its fear of burdening government with the task of proving the independence of its evidence would
58
be assuaged by the notice and objection procedure of that decision.'
Such a procedure is not available in the Byers context in which only
automatic immunity will suffice.' 59 Where this procedure is available,
154. Id. at 443-44 & n.4.
155. Id. at 458.
156. Id. at 444 n.4, quotedin text accompanying note 154 supra.
157. See id. at 458.
158. Cf.Daly v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d at 150, 560 P.2d at 1205, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 26
(the court suggests, in dicta, that the immunity granted in Day will be binding in federal
prosecutions: "If accommodation to state governmental interests in prosecuting crime is
sufficient to subject federal prosecutors to the burden of use immunity conferred without
prior notice or consultation [Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52], surely accommodation to the state's interest in the orderly resolution of civil disputes justifies the far lesser
burden of use immunity granted only after the federal prosecutor as well as state prosecuting
officials have been given adequate notice and opportunity to interpose a conclusive
objection").
159. See note 132 supra.
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however, it is preferable to the inflexible and burdensome restrictions
of Byers.

IV.

The Progeny of Byers: DeCamp v. First
Kensington Corporation

Read broadly, Byers v. Justice Court stands for the proposition that
a statute compelling disclosure of potentially incriminating information
may give rise to automatic use restrictions. Under this liberal reading,
a party or witness disclosing information pursuant to a statute in the
course of civil litigation would be entitled to use and derivative use
immunity in any criminal prosecution. Thus, where civil litigation precedes or accompanies a criminal prosecution, the government could be
forced to prove that its evidence has not been tainted by information
disclosed pursuant to statute.160 Arguably, when a statute compels disclosure, the discretionary grants of Kaufman and Daly would be unnecessary because statutorily compelled information and its fruits would
16 1
be automatically subject to use restrictions.
160. The investigation and prosecution of white-collar crime enhances the likelihood of
related criminal and civil litigation. See Bennett, Representing a Defendant in Simultaneous
Criminal and 4dministrative Proceedings: A PracticalApproach, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 381
(1978); Fiske, Forewordto White Collar Crime: 4 Survey ofLaw, 18 AM. CRim. L. REv. 165,
165-67 (1980). For a discussion of problems of concurrent litigation from a defense perspective, see Bennett, supra; Brodsky, Sef-Incrimination in White-CollarFraudInvestigations: A
PracticalApproachforLawyers, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 125 (1976). See also Note, Concurrent
Civil and CriminalProceedings, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 1277 (1967); Note, Resolving Tensions
Between Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity in Concurrent or Related Proceedings, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 674 (1976). Concerning the possibility of criminal non-support charges
following a civil determination of paternity, see Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28-29, 593
P.2d 226, 230-31, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533-34 (1979), Gonzales v. Superior Court, 117 Cal.
App. 3d 57, 178 Cal. Rptr. 358, (1980); Smith v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 422, 168
Cal. Rptr. 24 (1980).
161. The danger of automatic restrictions is apparent in the history of the first federal
immunity statute, as documented by Robert G. Dixon, Jr. See Dixon, The Ff/h Amendment
andFederalImmunityStatutes, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REV.447, 450-54 (1954). See also Dixon,
Comment on Immunity Provisions,in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 1405, 1406-07 (1970). The statute, enacted by the
thirty-fourth Congress in 1857, was intended to aid an investigation of alleged congressional
corruption. The Act provided in part, "No person examined and testifying before either
House of Congress, or any committee of either House, shall be held to answer criminally in
any court ofjustice, or subject [sic] to any penalty or forfeiture for any fact or act touching
which he shall be required to testify. .. ." Id. at 1407. Under this formula, a witness
could acquire transactional immunity simply by testifying before a congressional committee
and without invoking the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1406-07. Dixon writes, "In their zeal to
give investigating committees effective power to compel testimony, the members of the
thirty-fourth Congress had phrased an immunity provision which could be, and soon was,
abused. By cleverly provoking an inquiry and getting the right questions and answers into
the record, a criminal could take advantage of the clause extending immunity'. . . for any
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While it may seem that a reading of Byers which supports automatic immunity for civil litigants would be unwarranted, 62 such a
reading has been adopted by a California appellate court. In DeCamp

v. FirstKensington Corporation,1 63 the California Court of Appeal, Second District, imposed automatic use restrictions for the benefit of
noncorporate defendants in civil actions. In considering the automatic
immunity of DeCamp, it will be argued that this immunity, unlike the

discretionary grants of Kaufman and Daly, unduly hampers criminal
prosecutions and that Daol-like procedures should be employed in the
DeCamp context.
In DeCamp, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint naming an individual and a corporation as defendants and seeking compensatory and
punitive damages. The verified complaint alleged that the defendants,

by false promises, had induced the plaintiff to give $35,000 to the defendant corporation. 16 After filing demurrers, which were overruled,
the defendants filed a general denial, which was not verified.1 65 The
answer contained an explanation for this failure to verify and, presumably, for the failure to file a specific denial: "[T]o require these answering Defendants to file a verified answer to portions of Plaintiffs
Complaint could and would violate these answering Defendants' rights
afforded under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
1

66

States Constitution."
The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the answer or, alternatively,
for either a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment. In
making this motion, the plaintiff relied on California Code of Civil
fact or act touching which [sic] he shall be required to testify.' It was stated in Congress that
'every day persons are offering to testify before the investigating committees of the House in
order to bring themselves within the pardoning power of the act of 1857.'" Dixon, The F#th
Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 447, 453-54 (1954)
(footnotes omitted).
While an automatic transactional immunity such as that found in the 1857 Act creates a
greater potential for abuse than an automatic use immunity, both lack the requirement that
the privilege be expressly asserted, and both seem to deny the government control over the
scope of the immunity imposed. See Dixon, Comment on Immuni t Provisions, supra, at
1406, 1416-17, 1422. "All commentators recommend, and principle and logic seem to dictate, abolishing all 'automatic' immunity language [from federal immunity statutes] and
adopting 'claim language' as the proper mode for a compulsory testimony act." Id. at 1422.
See also United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
162. At least it would seem unwarranted from this author's reading of Byers for the
reasons discussed in text following note 174 infra.
163. 83 CaL App. 3d 268, 147 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1978).
164. Id. at 271, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Procedure sections 431.30 and 446.167 Section 431.30 provides, in part,
that a general denial is permitted only when a complaint is not verifled;6 section 446 provides, in part, that when a complaint is verified
the answer shall also be verified. 169 In response to the plaintiffs motion, the court first gave the defendants further opportunity to conform
to the verification requirement of section 446. When the defendants
did not comply, the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion to strike
the unverified answer and, upon entry of default against the defend170
ants, issued judgments for the plaintiff.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the default judgment
against the corporate defendant on the grounds that a corporation enjoys no privilege against self-incrimination.1 7 1 As to the individual defendant, the court reversed and ruled that the defendant was entitled to
another opportunity to file a verified answer. 17 2 The court based its
ruling first on a determination that section 446, like the hit-and-run
statute in Byers, violates the privilege against self-incrimination, and
second by a decision, as in Byers, to save the statute by implying use
and derivative use immunity. 173 The implied immunity extended to the
contents of the verified answer and its fruits. 7 4 Since the DeCamp
immunity was implied from a statute, it is automatic and apparently
extends to all defendants enjoying the privilege who file potentially
self-incriminating verified answers in California courts.
The decision in DeCamp contained at least two errors. Central to
both of these errors is a mistaken application of Byers. By treating
DeCamp as analogous to Byers, the appellate court ignored the Daly
procedures designed to protect law enforcement interests. By imposing
an automatic immunity where it was not needed and did not further
law enforcement interests, the court exceeded its jurisdiction.
The court in DeCamp first erred in failing to ask whether the individual defendant had effectively asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. The defendant had filed a general denial. He had
justified the failure to file a verified answer on the basis of a general
claim of privilege "under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 272, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 431.30 (West Supp. 1981).
CAL.CODE CIV. PROC. § 446 (West Supp. 1981).
83 Cal. App. 3d at 271, 272, 147 CaL Rptr. at 871.
Id. at 280-82, 284, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 876-78, 879.
Id. at 284, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
Id. at 274-80, 147 CaL Rptr. at 872-76.
Id. at 277-78, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75.

Winter 1982]

SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION

United States Constitution."17' 5 Even if all the allegations in the complaint called for an incriminatory response, the defendant should have

been required to assert separately his privilege in response to particular
allegations.' 76 The court might have interpreted section 446 to require
verification of those responses which could be answered without in-

fringing upon the privilege; as to the remaining matters, a general denial might have been permitted. While such an interpretation may not
be apparent in the language of the statute or its legislative history, it is
no less logical-and substantially less hazardous--than creating automatic use restrictions for a broad class of noncorporate defendants.
175. 83 Cal. App. 3d at 271, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 871. Apparently, both the individual and
corporate defendants relied totally on federal law; no claim of privilege was asserted on
independent state grounds. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 360 (1976) (asserting independent state grounds and refusing to follow Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (West Supp. 1981); Brennan, State
Constitutionsand the Protection ofIndividualRights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
176. The time at which a defendant may assert his privilege against self-incrimination
depends upon the nature of the proceedings. A defendant in a criminal case may assert his
privilege prior to any interrogation of him, since the privilege protects an accused in a criminal case from being called to the witness stand and testifying. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 930
(West 1966). This is similarly true ofjuvenile proceedings, which are regarded as "criminal"
for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967),
and of contempt proceedings, which in California are made criminal by statute, Killpatrick
v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 2d 146, 148-49, 314 P.2d 164, 165-66 (1957). See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 166 (West 1970).
Where a privilege has been asserted by someone other than the defendant in a "criminal" trial, California courts have held that the privilege may be invoked only in response to
particular questions. See Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 688, 499 P.2d 968, 974, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 288, 294 (1972) (dicta that attorney in disciplinary proceeding may not refuse to be
called to testify); Exparte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, 53, 11 P. 459, 460 (1886) (nondefendant witness
in a criminal case refuses to be sworn; finding of contempt upheld); McComb v. Superior
Court, 68 Cal. App. 3d 89, 98-99, 137 Cal. Rptr. 233, 237-38 (1977) (justice in judicial fitness
proceeding may not refuse to submit to deposition on grounds of self-incrimination; contempt order vacated on other grounds); Fielder v. Berkeley Properties Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d
30, 40, 99 Cal. Rptr. 791, 797 (1972) (privilege does not permit subpoenaed witness to refuse
to appear and testify at an administrative hearing); People v. Whelchel, 255 Cal. App. 2d
455, 461, 63 Cal. Rptr. 258, 263 (1967) (privilege does not permit person subject to narcotic
addiction rehabilitation proceeding to refuse to be called as a witness or to refuse to testify).
Where the privilege is reasonably asserted in response to particular questions, however,
contempt citations and orders to compel are improper. See Zonver v. Superior Court, 270
Cal. App. 2d 613, 76 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1969) (writ issued restraining trial court from compelling
answers to identified interrogatories and generically described questions on deposition);
Peck's Liquor, Inc. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 2d 772, 34 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1963) (writ
issued prohibiting trial court from compelling answers to questions posed on deposition); In
re Leavitt, 174 Cal. App. 2d 535, 345 P.2d 75 (1959) (petitioner discharged where trial court
had held petitioner in contempt for refusing to answer questions posed in course of a judgment-debtor's examination); Cohen v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 61, 343 P.2d 286
(1959) (writ granted restraining trial court from holding Mickey Cohen in contempt for refusing to answer questions posed in a civil trial). See a/so Overend v. Superior Court, 131
Cal. 280, 63 P. 372 (1900).
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The court's failure to consider the lack of specificity in the defendant's claim of privilege apparently rests on a tendency to view the facts
in DeCamp as analogous to those in Byers. In Byers, a motorist engaged in an accident refused to stop; the manner in which he asserted
his privilege was not open to refinement.177 In DeCamp, on the other
hand, a litigant served with a verified complaint refused to file a verified answer. The litigant had access to the court and was represented
by counsel. Refinement in this context was both possible and
necessary.
The tendency to view the immunity issue in DeCamp as analogous
to that in Byers also apparently explains the court's second error-its
treatment of section 446 as a substantive statute. Section 446, when
read with section 431.30, is like other sections in the California Code of
Civil Procedure that require litigants to make sworn or verified statements.17 Although section 446 requires a verified statement at the
pleading stage, it appears to be conceptually no different from statutes
requiring verified or sworn responses from a party during discovery or
trial. 179 Each of the statutes is designed to encourage truthful responses

to questions or assertions. Unlike the substantive hit-and-run statute
examined in Byers, these procedural statutes do not require a statement
of any particular content. The content of a response to a verified complaint, interrogatory, deposition question, or question in trial is determined not by statute, but by the content of the allegations or questions
to which the response is directed.
When section 446 is viewed as a procedural statute, the parallels
between DeCamp and Daly become evident. The plaintiff in Dal,, as
in DeCamp, sought compliance with a procedural statute which required truthful responses to questions or assertions. The defendants in
both cases objected by asserting their Fifth Amendment rights. The
difference between the cases is that in Dal, the objection arose during
discovery, while in DeCamp it occurred at the time of pleading. That
difference, however, does not warrant immunity grants of different
forms.
177. See note 132 supra.
178. See, ag., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019(c) (West Supp. 1981) (oath required of
deponent in oral or written deposition); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2030(a) (West Supp. 1981)
(interrogatories must be answered "separately and fully in writing under oath"); CAL. Crv.
PPoc. CODE § 2033(a) (West Supp. 1981) (sworn statement required to deny matters of
which an admission is requested or to set forth reasons why such matters cannot truthfully
be admitted or denied).
179. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 710 (West 1966) ("Every witness before testifying shall take
an oath or make an affirmation or declaration in the form provided by law"); CAL. Civ.
PRoc. CODE §§ 2094-2097 (West 1955) (form of oath).
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Had the appellate court considered the parallels between DeCamp

and Daly, it might have examined the possibility of employing a Dalylike procedure in the context of DeCamp. Without such a procedure,
"undue hampering" of criminal prosecutions is a practical certainty. 180
If DeCamp is the law in California, then virtually all incriminatory verified answers of noncorporate defendants are enshrouded with use and
derivative use immunity. No invocation of the privilege need appear in

the answer; the immunity arises automatically, as in Byers. If the party
signing the verified answer is charged with a criminal offense related to
the civil action, the prosecution will have the burden of proving that its
evidence is untainted by the immunized document."8
180. The court in DeCamp took the opposite view and noted that "[a]nswers do not require a statement of evidentiary facts." 83 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 875. While
general pleading rules may only require the pleading of ultimate facts, see id, the proper
question seems to be not what is required, but what is permissible. Unless the DeCamp
immunity were limited to the required statements, any statements included in the pleading
presumably would be covered by use and derivative use immunity. Hence, by choosing
which statements to include in his pleadings, the answering party would control the scope of
his own immunity. But see Daly v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d at 144, 560 P.2d at 1201, 137
Cal. Rptr. at 22. Even if the DeCamp immunity were limited to required statements--thus
raising a question of what is necessary and what is superfluous in any particular pleadingthe prosecutor would not control the scope of immunity; control would rest instead with the
plaintiff. Thus, a collusive suit appears possible. See Dixon, The Fih Amendment andFederallmmunity Statutes, 22 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 447, 453-54 (1954).
The court's view in DeCamp that criminal prosecutions would not be substantially
hampered by use and derivative use immunity was also supported by the claim that an
admission in an answer would not operate to disclose the defendant's connection with the
offense charged in the complaint since "such connection is already fully disclosed by the
complaint." 83 Cal. App. 3d at 278-79, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 875. An answer, however, may
contain leads not included in the complaint. Moreover, where prosecutors are faced with
limited resources and a multitude of possible investigations, not all leads will receive equal
priority. All else being equal, an allegation coupled with an admission would appear to be a
more fruitful lead than would a mere allegation. It would seem empirically inaccurate to
say that prosecutors rely upon allegations and ignore admissions. On the other hand, the
court in DeCamp is perhaps suggesting that, as a matter of law, the fruit of an immunized
answer will be protected from taint when the immunized answer is responsive to allegations
independently known by the prosecution, such as allegations found in a complaint. Such a
principle, however, may not square with Kastigarv. UnitedStates, which imposes an affirmative duty on prosecutors to prove that proferred evidence is derived from a source "wholly
independent" of immunized testimony. 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) (emphasis added).
181. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-62 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 57, 79 n.18 (1964); United States v. Romano, 583 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978)
(affirming conviction and upholding finding that the prosecution's evidence was not obtained in violation of use immunity granted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005); United States v.
Nemes, 555 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing conviction on ground that the prosecution had
not satisfied its burden of proving that its evidence had been derived from sources independent of state-immunized grand jury testimony); United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 100610 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing conviction of one appellant on the ground, inter ala, that the
prosecution had not satisfied its burden of proving that its evidence had been derived from
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If Dal-ike procedures were employed in the DeCamp context,

judicial interference with the executive function of criminal prosecution would be avoided or minimized.1 82 With that end in mind, the

following is proposed:
(1) If an individual defendant in a civil suit responds to an allegation of a complaint by asserting his privilege against self-incrimination, any grant of immunity should be preceded by a request. The
burden of filing the immunity request may be placed, as in Daly, on the
party seeking an informative response or, in the alternative, on the
sources independent of federal grand jury testimony immunized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 60016005; several appellants whose convictions were not reversed by the Second Circuit unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, 430 U.S. 982, 429 U.S. 1051, 1066
(1977); 429 U.S. 980 (1976)); United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing
trial court's dismissal of an indictment and remanding to allow prosecution further opportunity to prove that the testimony of the key prosecution witness was not derived from defendant's own immunized testimony); People v. Lawrence, 25 Cal. App. 3d 498, 510, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 16, 24 (1972) (affirming a murder conviction where defendant, prior to his state trial,
had testified in federal court under an immunity grant, and where the immunized testimony
had "no bearing or relation whatsoever" to the state prosecution). See also United States v.
Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d at 516,
and approving Kurzer's "perceptive discussion" of why the government's burden in proving
the untainted character of its evidence is higher where immunity has been granted than
where evidence has been unlawfully seized); Brennick v. Hynes, 471 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.N.Y.
1979) (denying preliminary injunction sought against state prosecutors who allegedly were
using immunized testimony given by plaintiff under the Bankruptcy Act to obtain an indictment against plaintif); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 465 F. Supp. 618 (N.D.
Ill.) (granting motion to compel depositions where prospective deponents could not reasonably fear criminal prosecution due to their prior immunized testimony and the scope of
resulting "taint"), vacated, 609 F.2d 867 (1979).
182. By its terms, § 2019(b)(1) pertains to depositions, not pleadings. It may be argued,
therefore, that Da/y-like procedures, adopted in furtherance of the court's discretion under
§ 2019(b)(1), are beyond the court's jurisdiction where proposed for use in the context of
pleadings. In Kaufman, however, which also involved § 2019(b)(1), the trial court was directed to fashion an immunity order which protected Kaufman at trial as well as at his
deposition. 12 Cal. 3d at 433, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 820. Since trials, like pleadings, lie outside
the confines of discovery, Kaufman appears to authorize an extension of § 2019(b)(1) immunity to the trial itself and arguably supports a discretionary immunity order at the pleading
stage as well. But regardless of whether or not Daly-like procedures at the pleading stage
are available pursuant to § 2019(b)(1), a trial court should have jurisdiction to employ the
rules at the pleading stage and in other contexts. The judiciary would seem to have inherent
power "to protect a party... from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression." Id. at 426,
115 Cal. Rptr. at 815. Where a protective order is needed, the apparent limitation of
§ 2019(b)(1) to depositions should not bar its use in other contexts. See Gonzales v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 57, 178 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1980) (authorizing the issuance of a
Kaufman immunity order in paternity suits initiated by a district attorney where the defendants asserted their privilege against self-incrimination in response to written interrogatories);
People v. Superior Court (Taylor), 53 Cal. App. 3d 996, 126 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975) (authorizing the issuance of a Kaufman immunity order in a Red Light Abatement action where the
defendant asserted his privilege against self-incrimination in response to written
interrogatories).
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party asserting the privilege and wishing to1 8 avoid
a later summary
4

judgment8

3

or other injurious consequences.

(2) Regardless of which party initiates the request, prosecuting
authorities, as in Daly, should be given adequate notice and the opportunity to object.
(3) If no prosecuting authority objects, the trial court should issue an order for use and derivative use immunity limited in scope to
the terms of the notice to prosecutors. If a prosecuting authority does
object and an accommodation cannot be reached between the prosecutor and the requesting party, the trial court should be left with discretion to fashion an order which respects the constitutional prerogatives
of the executive
branch as well as the constraints of the Fifth
18 5
Amendment.
183. See James Talcott, Inc. v. Short, 100 CaL App. 3d 504, 510, 161 Cal. Rptr. 63, 66
(1979) (holding that civil defendants who had asserted their privilege against self-incrimination in a private civil suit and who had failed to seek immunity from a federal prosecutor
were not excused from their burden of producing evidence in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment; partial summary judgment affirmed).
184. Notwithstanding dicta at least suggesting the contrary, see, e.g., Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967), stating that the Fifth Amendment prohibits imposing any sanction
that makes the assertion of the privilege "costly," civil litigants have suffered injurious consequences as a result of invoking the Fifth Amendment. Where a complaining party asserts
his privilege against self-incrimination in the course of discovery, the action may in some
circumstances be dismissed. Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969); Geldback
Transport, Inc. v. Delay, 443 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1969). See also Jones v. B.C. Christopher &
Co., 466 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 3d 545 (1965). But see Wehling v.
C.B.S., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979); Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979).
Where it is the defendant who asserts the privilege in the course of discovery, it is not uncommon for courts to bar the defendant from waiving the privilege and testifying at time of
trial concerning the previously privileged matters. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75
Cal. App. 3d 554, 142 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1977), appealrdismissed,436 U.S. 952 (1978); Myers v.
Second Judicial Dist. Court, 95 Nev. 176, 591 P.2d 259 (1979); Costanza v. Costanza, 66 N.J.
63, 328 A.2d 230 (1974); Annest v. Annest, 49 Wash. 2d 62, 298 P.2d 483 (1956) (holding that
in a custody hearing the trial court erred in denying the husband's motion to strike his wife's
testimony where the respondent-wife asserted privilege in the course of cross-examination;
error was not reversible due to lack of prejudice); Levin v. Levin, 129 N.J. Super. 142, 144,
322 A.2d 486, 488 (1974) (holding husband-defendant, who had asserted privilege in response to interrogatories in divorce proceeding, subject to the same sanctions as any other
litigant refusing to make discovery, "short of being held in contempt for his refusal to answer"). Butsee CAL. EvID. CODE § 913 (West 1966) (prohibiting a trier of fact from drawing
any inferences from assertion of privilege in a criminal or civil matter).
185. The trial court apparently cannot, as in DeCamp, insist that the defendant file a
verified answer pursuant to § 446 and, if none is forthcoming, enter judgment for the plaintiff. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 446 (West Supp. 1981). Although the Fifth Amendment may
permit a defendant ultimately to suffer adverse consequences as a result of invoking his
privilege, it would seem not to permit an immediate judgment against him at the pleading
stage. See generally note 184 supra. The court, however, might grant a stay in order to
allow for the eventual removal of the threat of self-incrimination. See Wehling v. C.B.S.,
608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979); A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 142
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Conclusion
Use and derivative use immunity removes the threat of self-incrimination and permits the compulsion of otherwise privileged testimony. It does so by barring the prosecution from the use of compelled
testimony and its fruits. Since the privilege against self-incrimination
may block a civil litigant's access to needed information, the availability of discretionary use and derivative use immunity advances the just
resolution of civil disputes.
The California Supreme Court has authorized discretionary grants
of immunity following assertions of the privilege made in the course of
depositions. Whether by case law or legislation, an expansion of this
authorization is needed. The opportunity to seek an immunity grant
should extend to most pretrial contexts, including pleading and civil
discovery in general.
As developed in California, discretionary immunity permits an advancement in the resolution of civil disputes without a compensating
loss in the fair prosecution of public offenses. California's discretionary immunity protects law enforcement with rights of notice and conclusive objection. Automatic immunity, on the other hand, provides no
such protection. Although it may be used, as in Murphy, to accommodate conflicting governmental interests, courts should not employ this
immunity to aid civil litigants at the expense of criminal prosecutions.
To do so constitutes improper judicial interference with an executive
function.

Cal. Rptr. 390 (1977). Where a stay is not practical or is not desired by the plaintiff and an
immunity order is opposed by the executive branch (i.e., a prosecutor), it would seem appropriate for the court to permit the filing of an unverified general denial notwithstanding
§ 446. Assuming that the court in DeCamp is correct in its interpretation of the legislative
history of § 446, see 83 Cal. App. 3d at 275-76, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74, and given the
constraints of the Fifth Amendment, either the intent of the legislature or the constitutional
perogatives of the executive must give way. By permitting the filing of an unverified denial
only when the executive opposes a requested grant of immunity, the judiciary minimizes the
occasions when the legislature's will is frustrated. Cf. King v. Terwilliger, 259 A. D. 437, 19
N.Y.S.2d 657 (1940) (holding that a defendant may file an unverified answer where the
privilege against self-incrimination precludes the filing of a verified response); David Webb,
Inc. v. Rosenstiel, 66 Misc. 2d 29,31, 319 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Gullo v. Courtright, 62 Misc. 2d 721, 723, 309 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (Monroe County Ct. 1970).

